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Abstract—We consider the problem where a group of wireless
nodes, connected to the same broadcast domain, want to create
pairwise secrets, in the presence of an adversary Eve, who
tries to listen in and steal these secrets. Existing solutions
assume that Eve cannot perform certain computations (e.g., large-
integer factorization) in useful time. We ask the question: can
we solve this problem without assuming anything about Eve’s
computational capabilities?
We propose a simple secret-agreement protocol, where the
wireless nodes keep exchanging bits until they have agreed
on pairwise secrets that Eve cannot reconstruct with very
high probability. Our protocol relies on Eve’s limited network
presence (the fact that she cannot be located at an arbitrary
number of points in the network at the same time), but assumes
nothing about her computational capabilities. We formally show
that, under standard theoretical assumptions, our protocol is
information-theoretically secure (it leaks zero information to Eve
about the secrets). Using a small wireless testbed of smartphones,
we provide experimental evidence that it is feasible for 5 nodes
to create thousands of secret bits per second, with their secrecy
being independent from the adversary’s capabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem where a group of n nodes, con-
nected to the same wireless broadcast domain, want to create
pairwise secrets, such that an adversary Eve, who is eaves-
dropping on their domain, obtains very little information on
the secrets. Today, we can solve this problem only by relying
on Eve’s computational limitations: we can use an asymmetric
key-agreement protocol, like RSA [1], which fundamentally
assume that Eve cannot perform certain computations, such
as large-integer factorization.
Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different,
complementary kind of security, which relies not on the ad-
versary’s computational limitations, but on her limited network
presence. Suppose Alice, Bob, and Eve are wireless nodes con-
nected to the same broadcast domain. When Alice transmits,
both Bob and Eve will overhear a part of her transmission,
however, as long as there is sufficient noise, it is unlikely that
they will overhear exactly the same information. It has been
long known in the information theory community that, if Bob
and Eve do not overhear exactly the same information from
Alice’s transmission, it is theoretically possible for Alice and
Bob to create a shared secret Eve knows nothing about, even
if Eve has arbitrary computational capabilities [2], [3]. The
question is, can we turn this theoretical feasibility result into
a concrete secret-agreement protocol? how well would such a
protocol work on an actual wireless network?
First, we present a secret-agreement protocol, which enables
n nodes to create pairwise secrets that Eve knows very little
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about. Our protocol has polynomial complexity and is imple-
mentable in simple wireless devices. Also, it creates all the
pairwise secrets simultaneously by harnessing the broadcast
nature of wireless networks. The latter property enables secret
agreement to achieve a significant secret-generation rate even
with large numbers of nodes (to the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to make this observation). Under standard
information-theory assumptions (independent erasure channels
between the nodes and known erasure probabilities), we for-
mally show that: (1) Our protocol is information-theoretically
secure, i.e., it leaks no information to Eve about the secrets. (2)
It achieves a secret-generation rate that is optimal for n = 2
nodes and scales well with the number of nodes n.
Second, we provide experimental evidence that it is feasible
to use our protocol in practice to create thousands of secret
bits per second. In particular, we use a small wireless testbed
that consists of 5 nodes and an adversary, located in adjacent
offices. In our testbed, the nodes create pairwise secrets at
rates of thousands of bits per second, independently from the
adversary’s computational capabilities.
Unlike current security systems, our protocol creates secrets
that do not depend on any information permanently stored at
the nodes—only on traffic exchanged among them. Hence, the
nodes could use our protocol to periodically create new secrets,
then use these secrets to constantly refresh their encryption
and authentication keys. The nodes do not need to maintain
any public/private RSA key pair or WPA master key that, if
stolen or accidentally revealed to an adversary, would enable
her to reconstruct the secrets (hence compromise the nodes’
communications).
Most importantly, we shift the adversary’s challenge from
computation to network presence: for current systems, a dan-
gerous adversary is one with high computational power (e.g.,
one with access to quantum computers); for our protocol, a
dangerous adversary is one who is physically present in many
locations in the network at the same time.
We do not advocate to replace the existing crypto-systems
that rely on the adversary’s computational limitations. How-
ever, we believe that exploring alternative approaches (which
rely on different kinds of adversary limitations) will become
of increasing interest in the near future, as governments
and corporations acquire massive computational capabilities.
Interest in alternatives is already present in the industry
community, where several companies are developing quantum
key distribution (QKD) systems [4]. A typical application
envisioned for these systems is the periodic generation of
one-time pads at a high enough rate to enable information-
theoretically secure transmission of real-time video, e.g., for
military operations [5]. Unfortunately, QKD systems are ex-
pensive (due to the need for sophisticated equipment such
as photon detectors) and therefore accessible only to the
wealthiest governments and corporations. This motivated us
to explore the feasibility of a secret-agreement protocol that
neither relies on computational limitations nor requires expen-
sive equipment. We focus on wireless devices, as they form the
majority of network-connected devices. We consider groups
of such devices (as opposed to isolated pairs), as wireless
group cooperation schemes are becoming increasingly popular
to support social applications [6]. As we will show, it turns out
that by simultaneously creating multiple secrets we achieve a
multi-fold increase in efficiency.
After stating our problem (§II), we first describe our basic
secret-agreement protocol, which enables n nodes to create
pairwise secrets under standard theoretical assumptions (§III),
and we state its properties (§IV). Next, we adapt our protocol
to the scenario where the theoretical assumptions do not hold
(§V), and provide experimental evidence of its capabilities
(§VI). Finally, we summarize related work (§VII), and we con-
clude with a discussion of the remaining challenges (§VIII).
II. SETUP
A. Problem Statement
We consider n nodes, T1, . . . , Tn, connected to the same
wireless broadcast domain. We will refer to these nodes as
terminals. Sometimes we will refer to terminals T1, T2, T3,
and T4 respectively as Alice, Bob, Calvin, and David.
We consider an adversary, Eve, connected to the same
broadcast domain as the terminals. Our design assumes that
Eve may possess up to some number of receiving antennas
m. But we should state upfront that the experimental results
presented in Section V assume that Eve is an HTC smartphone
with one omnidirectional antenna.
The terminals communicate with each other in two ways:
- When we say that terminal Ti transmits a packet, we
mean that it broadcasts the packet once.
- When we say that terminal Ti reliably broadcasts a
packet, we mean that it ensures that all other terminals
Tj 6=i receive it, e.g., through ACKs and retransmissions.
To be conservative, we assume that Eve receives all reliably
broadcast packets.
Our goal is to design a protocol that enables each terminal
pair, Ti and Tj , to create a secret Sij , such that any other
terminal Tl 6=i,j or Eve obtain very little information on Sij .
We assume that each terminal Ti is “honest but curious”
toward the other terminals. I.e., Ti runs the protocol honestly
but may try to eavesdrop on other terminals’ communications.
We assume that Eve may be a passive adversary (never
makes any transmissions) or an active one (may try to im-
personate a terminal). If Eve is passive, the terminals do not
need to share any information before they run our protocol.
If Eve is active, the terminals need to initially share some
bootstrap information, in order to authenticate each other when
they first communicate with each other (until they create their
first pairwise secrets using our protocol). The need for this
Symbol Meaning
n Number of terminals
Ti Terminal i
Sij Secret between terminals Ti and Tj
δij Erasure probability of Ti – Tj channel
δiE Erasure probability of Ti – Eve channel
N Number of x-packets transmitted by each terminal
(initial phase, step 1)
Mij Number of shared y-packets constructed by Ti and Tj
(privacy amplification phase, steps 1 – 3)
TABLE I
COMMONLY USED SYMBOLS
bootstrap information is fundamentally unavoidable: without
it, there is no way for Alice to know that she is talking to
Bob until they have established their first secret. However,
any pairwise secrets created through the protocol should not
depend on the bootstrap information.
This setup corresponds to the scenario where a group of n
political dissidents rendezvous in a public place (potentially
under visual surveillance) and use their cell phones in ad-
hoc mode to secretly communicate; or the scenario where a
group of n friends connect to the same social network and use
their cell phones in ad-hoc mode to exchange private content.
It should be infeasible for an eavesdropper who listens in
on the same broadcast domain to record what she overhears,
process the recording, and reconstruct their communications.
Moreover, it should be infeasible for an eavesdropper to record
what she overhears, extract from the dissidents/friends a set
of passwords or keys, combine them with the recording, and
reconstruct their communications. The dissidents/friends can
periodically use our protocol to create pairwise secrets and use
these secrets to continuously refresh the keys with which they
encrypt/authenticate their communications.
B. Theoretical Network Conditions
We define them as follows:
1) When terminal Ti transmits a packet,
terminal Tj (Eve):
- misses the entire packet, with probability δij (δiE)
- receives the entire packet correctly, otherwise.
δij (δiE) is the erasure probability of the Ti – Tj (Ti –
Eve) channel.
2) The Ti – Tj channel is independent from any Ti – Tl 6=j
channel1 and the Ti – Eve channel, for all i, j, l.
3) The erasure probability δiE of the Ti – Eve channel is
known, for all i.
C. Quality Metrics
Efficiency captures the cost of the protocol, i.e., the amount
of traffic it produces in order to generate pairwise secrets of
a given size. The efficiency achieved by two terminals Ti and
Tj that create a secret Sij is defined as:
Eij =
|Sij |
transmitted bits
.
1Assuming independent channels is not necessary for any of our results,
but simplifies our proofs.
The denominator is the total number of bits transmitted by the
protocol until Sij is created.
The secrecy rate achieved by Ti and Tj is the number of
secret bits per second that they create between them. It depends
on the transmission rates of the terminals and their efficiency.
Reliability captures the quality of the created secrets, i.e.,
the extent to which they are unknown to Eve. The reliability
of a secret S is defined as:
R =
H(S|XE)
H(S)
,
where XE is the information obtained by Eve via eaves-
dropping on the terminals’ communications, H(S) is Eve’s
entropy (her uncertainty about S before she eavesdrops), and
H(S|XE) is Eve’s conditional entropy (her uncertainty about
S after she eavesdrops). R = 1 means that Eve learns
nothing about S by eavesdropping (which would mean that
the protocol is information-theoretically secure).
III. BASIC PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the core of our secret-agreement
protocol, which enables terminals Ti and Tj to create a
secret Sij . Assuming the theoretical network conditions, Sij
is perfectly secret from any terminal Tk 6=i,j and an adversary
Eve (we show this in Section IV).
A. Basic Idea
Suppose Alice and Bob exchange three packets, x1, x2 and
x3. Suppose Eve misses (knows nothing about the contents of)
two of the packets shared by Alice and Bob, x1 and x2. If an
oracle told Alice and Bob that Eve misses two of their shared
packets (but not which two), they could create a perfect shared
secret (one that Eve knows nothing about), by using two linear
combinations of their shared packets, e.g., 〈x1+x2, x2+x3〉2
(where + denotes addition over a finite field, e.g., bitwise XOR
over the binary field).
Building on this idea, our protocol consists of two phases: In
the initial phase, the terminals exchange traffic to ensure that
each terminal pair shares some number of packets (as Alice
and Bob share x1, x2, and x3 in the above example). This
happens over n rounds, with a different terminal transmitting
in each round. In the privacy amplification phase, each ter-
minal pair creates a secret out of the information they shared
in the initial phase. For this, they “compress” their shared
information enough to ensure that any other terminal or Eve
know nothing about the secret (as Alice and Bob “compress”
x1, x2, and x3 into x1 + x2, x2 + x3 in the above example).
To do this compression correctly, the terminals need to know
how much of their traffic exchange was overheard by Eve (but
not which particular bits).
A naive approach would be to have each terminal pair create
their secret separately, which would not scale well with the
number of terminals. Instead, our protocol creates the pairwise
secrets simultaneously, by harnessing the broadcast nature of
wireless networks.
2This secret is perfect, because Eve’s probability of guessing its value is
equal to the probability of guessing the values of the two packets she misses.
B. Algorithm
Each terminal Ti maintains n− 1 queues Qij , j 6= i. In the
beginning, these are empty.
Initial Phase
In round k = 1 . . . n:
1) Terminal Tk transmits N random packets (we will call
them x-packets).
2) Each terminal Ti6=k reliably broadcasts the identities of
the x-packets it received.
3) Each terminal Ti adds to queue Qij the identities and
contents of the x-packets it shares with terminal Tj 6=i.
At this point, Qij contains all the packets shared by termi-
nals Ti and Tj .
Privacy Amplification Phase
For i = 1 . . . n− 1:
1) Terminal Ti constructs Mij linear combinations of the
packets in the queue Qij , for all j > i (we will call
them y-packets).
It determines the number of y-packets Mij and con-
structs the y-packets as described in Section III-E.
2) Terminal Ti reliably broadcasts the coefficients it used
to construct the y-packets.
3) Each terminal Tj>i uses the broadcasted coefficients and
the contents of its queue Qji to reconstruct the Mij y-
packets.
At this point, terminals Ti and Tj>i share Mij y-packets.
Their secret Sij is the concatenation of these y-packets.
C. An Example Agreement
Suppose we have n = 3 terminals, Alice, Bob, and Calvin,
and a passive adversary, Eve. All the channels between termi-
nals or any terminal and Eve have erasure probability δ = 0.5.
In the initial phase, the terminals create shared information
by exchanging packets. In the first round, Alice transmits
N = 8 x-packets, a1, a2, . . . a8, of which Bob, Calvin, and
Eve receive (not the same) half. Similarly, in the second and
third rounds, Bob transmits b1, b2, . . . b8, and Calvin transmits
c1, c2, . . . c8. Alice, Bob, and Calvin know which x-packets
are received by one another (thanks to Step 2 of the initial
phase), but not which x-packets are received by Eve.
Table II shows the x-packets known to each node at the
end of the initial phase. Table III (top row) shows the x-
packets shared by each terminal pair at the end of the initial
phase (e.g., Alice and Bob share a1, a2, a3, a4 among others).
To help visualize who knows which x-packets, from the x-
packets shared by Alice/Bob, we mark those known to Eve as
“canceled out” (e.g., a3), those known to Calvin as “barred”
(e.g., a¯2), and those known to both Eve and Calvin as both
canceled out and barred (e.g., ¯a1). We do the same for the
other terminal pairs.
In the privacy amplification phase, the terminals create
pairwise secrets by compressing their shared information.
Alice Bob Calvin Eve
a1, a2, . . . a8 a1, a2, a3, a4 a1, a2, a5, a6 a1, a3, a5, a7
b1, b2, b3, b4 b1, b2, . . . b8 b1, b2, b5, b6 b1, b3, b5, b7
c1, c2, c3, c4 c1, c2, c5, c6 c1, c2, . . . c8 c1, c3, c5, c7
TABLE II
INFORMATION KNOWN TO EACH NODE
Phase Alice – Bob Alice – Calvin Bob – Calvin
¯a1, a¯2,a3, a4 ¯a1, a¯2,a5, a6 ¯a1, a¯2
Initial b¯1, b¯2, b3, b4 b¯1, b¯2 b¯1, b¯2, b5, b6
¯c1, c¯2 ¯c1, c¯2,c3, c4 ¯c1, c¯2,c5, c6
a3 + a4 a5 + a6 b5 + b6
Privacy a1 + a2 + a3 a1 + a2 + a5 b1 + b2 + b5
Amp. b3 + b4 c3 + c4 c5 + c6
b1 + b2 + b3 c1 + c2 + c3 c1 + c2 + c5
TABLE III
INFORMATION SHARED BY NODES
Alice and Bob compress their 10 shared x-packets into
M12 = 4 shared y-packets (linear combinations of the shared
x-packets). Similarly, Alice/Calvin and Bob/Calvin compress
their 10 shared x-packets into 4 shared y-packets. Table III
(bottom row) shows the y-packets shared by each terminal
pair. Notice that Eve cannot reconstruct any of the y-packets.
Moreover, Calvin cannot reconstruct the y-packets constructed
by Alice and Bob for their pairwise secret. Similarly, Alice
(Bob) cannot reconstruct the y-packets constructed by Bob
(Alice) and Calvin for their pairwise secret.
This was an example to give a sense of how things work.
Our protocol does not really construct so simple linear com-
binations (e.g., 5 random linear combinations out of 10 x-
packets), as they may leak information to Eve (Section III-E).
D. Key Points
The size of the secret between two terminals depends on
(1) the amount of information shared by the two terminals
and (2) how much of this information Eve and the other
terminals have missed. In the above example, Alice and Bob
share 10 x-packets. Of these, Eve misses 5, and Calvin
misses 4. Hence, Alice and Bob can construct up to 5 y-
packets (linear combinations of their shared x-packets) that
are perfectly secret from Eve, and up to 4 y-packets that are
perfectly secret from Calvin. Since we want the Alice/Bob
secret to be unknown to both Eve and Calvin, Alice/Bob
should create only 4 y-packets. Creating a shorter secret would
be inefficient. Creating a longer secret would necessarily result
in Eve or Calvin knowing something about the secret (though
not necessarily the entire secret).
An important feature of the protocol is that terminals Ti
and Tj create shared information during all the rounds of
the initial phase, not only when one of them transmits. In
the above example, at the end of the initial phase, Alice and
Bob share not only x-packets transmitted by one of them, but
also x-packets transmitted by Calvin (c1, c2). In the particular
example, these packets turn out not to be useful in creating
the Alice/Bob secret, because Calvin knows both of them (and
we want the secret to be unknown to Calvin). However, when
we have more than n = 3 terminals, leveraging x-packets
transmitted by all terminals becomes key to the protocol’s
scalability with the number of terminals. For instance, imagine
that there is a fourth terminal, David, which transmits x-
packets d1, d2, received by Alice/Bob, but not Calvin or Eve.
Although d1, d2 are known to David, now Alice/Bob can create
two combinations of c1, c2, d1, d2 (e.g., c1 + d1, c2 + d2) and
create two extra y-packets unknown to Calvin, David, and Eve.
E. Secret Construction
Terminals Ti and Tj construct the following number of y-
packets in the privacy amplification phase:
Mij = min { VE , V1, V2, . . . Vn } , (1)
where:
- VE is the expected number of x-packets that are shared
by terminals Ti/Tj and missed by Eve.
- Vl is the number of x-packets shared by terminals Ti/Tj
and missed by terminal Tl.
We compute VE as
∑n
k=1 UEk , where UEk = δkE · Uk, and
Uk is the number of x-packets transmitted by terminal Tk and
received by both terminals Ti/Tj in round k of the initial phase.
In short, we count, for each terminal and for Eve, how many
of Ti/Tj’s shared x-packets this terminal/Eve has missed (or
is expected to have missed, in Eve’s case), and we set Mij to
the smallest of these numbers.
It is straightforward to adapt this computation to the sce-
nario where up to some number of terminals collude to learn
Sij , but we do not consider this scenario in this paper.
Terminals Ti and Tj construct the y-packets using simple
constructions based on Maximum Distance Separable (MDS)
codes [7], as described in Lemma 5 in the Appendix. There
is no novelty in these constructions (they rely on standard
properties of MDS codes). One such property is that, if Eve
has t packets, then each y-packet involves at least t+1 packets,
which ensures that Eve cannot reconstruct it.
F. Active Adversaries and Authentication
To protect against active adversaries, the terminals need to
share some bootstrap information to authenticate each other
when they first communicate. Authentication is orthogonal to
our secret agreement and can happen in different ways, e.g., by
requiring the terminals to initially share bootstrap information
and use it to construct authentication codes for the x-packets
they transmit the first time they run our protocol. After the
terminals have established their first pairwise secrets using
our protocol, they can use these new secrets to construct new
authentication codes, which do not depend on the bootstrap
information.
One might argue: if the terminals have to share bootstrap
information anyway to defend against active adversaries, they
might as well share pairwise secrets to begin with and not
run our protocol at all. The advantage of our protocol is
that it enables the terminals to keep generating new secrets,
independent from the previous ones, and continuously refresh
their encryption and authentication keys. Unless the adversary
can break into one of the terminals while they run our protocol,
she has a small window of opportunity to compromise their
communication: she has to steal the bootstrap information and
impersonate a terminal while the terminals are running our
protocol for the first time.
IV. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
In this section, we state certain properties of the basic
protocol and also present an argument on why this particular
protocol outperforms a more obvious alternative. We summa-
rize the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 4 in the Appendix, Section A.
We omit the proof of Lemma 2, which is straightforward.
Lemma 1. If the theoretical network conditions hold, there
exists a sufficiently large N for which the basic protocol is
information-theoretically secure against a passive adversary.
From the previous lemma, our protocol is secure; next we
examine what efficiency it can achieve. Note that while for
n = 2, we create a single key S with some efficiency E,
for n ≥ 3, the efficiency is different for each secret Sij , and
depends on the erasure probabilities δki, δkj , and δkE . In our
notation, the efficiency simply corresponds to the ratio
Eij =
Mij
Nn
.
To calculate it, we need Mij , to count how many packets
a queue contains that Eve (or eavesdropping terminals) have
not received. Over the theoretical network conditions, we can
estimate Mij using expected values. Lemma 6 in the Appendix
provides concentration results showing that our estimation
error becomes zero exponentially fast in the number of packets
N . Lemma 2 provides such an example calculation.
Lemma 2. If the theoretical network conditions hold, and
we assume non-colluding eavesdroppers, then there exists a
sufficiently large N for which the basic protocol achieves:
• n = 2 terminals, E = δE(1− δ),
• n ≥ 3, if δ1 ≤ δij ≤ δ2 ∀ i, j and δE = mini δiE ,
Eij ≥min
{
δE(1− δ2)
[
(1− δ2) +
2δ2
n
]
,
δ1(1− δ2)
[
(1− δ2)−
1− 3δ2
n
]}
.
This lemma verifies an intuitive fact: as the number of
terminals (and transmission rounds in the initial phase) n
increases, what dominates the size of each queue is the number
of packets (1− δ2)2N jointly overhead by two terminals; the
fraction of these (δ1 or δE) that is unknown to our strongest
eavesdropper equals the amount of secrecy we can create. In
other words, the fact that we keep adding x-packets in each
queue during all rounds is the key in the protocol’s scalability.
Lemma 3. Under the conditions of Lemma 2, for n = 2
terminals, the basic protocol achieves maximum efficiency.
Indeed, the efficiency we achieve for n = 2 reaches
Maurer’s upper bound [3].
The basic protocol scales well with the number of terminals
because we try to leverage broadcasting as much as possible.
If we were, instead, attempting pairwise secret establishment,
the efficiency would quickly go to 0 with the number of
terminals. To see this, consider the following, conceptually
simpler alternative to the basic protocol: Consider a time-
division protocol, where we operate in time-slots, and at each
time-slot we create the key Sij between a specific terminal
pair, using the best possible protocol that achieves efficiency
δE(1−δ) [3]. Since we have
(
n
2
)
keys to create, and each key
is created during only one time-slot, the overall efficiency is
E(alt) = δE(1−δ)
(n2)
per key. Unlike the efficiency of our protocol
that converges to a constant value as n increases, E(alt) goes
to zero.
Finally, the most demanding operations a terminal needs to
perform is linear combining to create the y-packets. Thus:
Lemma 4. Each terminal that participates in the basic pro-
tocol executes an algorithm that is polynomial in N and n.
V. ADAPTING TO REAL NETWORKS
In this section, we adapt our basic secret-agreement protocol
(Section III) to the scenario where the theoretical network
conditions do not hold.
A. Basic Idea
The challenge with real networks is that we do not know the
size of the pairwise secrets (the Mij from Section III) that we
should create. In Section III-E, we were able to analytically
compute Mij because we assumed that we knew enough about
Eve’s channels to compute the expected amount of information
missed by Eve.
We conservatively estimate the amount of information
missed by Eve based on the amount of information missed by
the terminals. More specifically, Alice and Bob assume that,
during each round of the initial phase, Eve learns as much
information as any of the other terminals about the x-packets
shared by Alice/Bob. Hence, at the end of the initial phase,
Eve is assumed to know at least as many of the Alice/Bob
shared x-packets as the most knowledgeable terminal.
We chose this based on the following observations: Channel
behavior varies significantly over time, to the point where we
cannot estimate or even upper-bound how much information
Eve collects during one experiment based on how much
information she collected during past experiments. Channel
behavior also varies over space, but less so: if, during an
experiment, terminal Ti receives many packets in common
with neighbor Tj , then Ti most likely receives many packets
in common with its other neighbors as well. It turns out that,
by measuring how many packets each pair of neighboring
terminals receive in common during one experiment, we can
estimate quite accurately how many packets any terminal and
Eve receive in common in the same experiment. This, of
course, is an empirical estimation, thus we cannot guarantee
its accuracy theoretically.
B. Secret Construction
Terminals Ti and Tj estimate that, at the end of the initial
phase, from their shared x-packets, Eve misses the following
number:
VE =
n∑
k 6=i,j, k=1
min{ V k1 , V
k
2 , . . . V
k
n }, (2)
where:
- V kl is the number of new x-packets shared by terminals
Ti/Tj and missed by terminal Tl during round k of the
initial phase.
In short, we assume that, in each round of the initial phase,
Eve missed as few (of the x-packets newly shared by Ti/Tj
in this round) as any other terminal.
C. Key Points
If we do not assume theoretical network conditions, we
cannot offer formal guarantees about the reliability of our pro-
tocol, because we do not know exactly how much information
Eve collects during the initial phase: it is theoretically possible
that Eve receives more x-packets in common with the termi-
nals than we estimate, which means that she learns something
about the pairwise secrets. The amount of information that
leaks to Eve depends both on the particular wireless network
and the number of terminals: the more terminals we have, the
more we learn about the quality of channels throughout the
network, and the better we can estimate the quality of Eve’s
channels. Hence, the amount of information that leaks to Eve
needs to be experimentally assessed in each wireless network
as a function of the number of terminals n.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally evaluate our adapted
secret-agreement protocol (Section V) on a small wireless
testbed. Our goal is to answer two questions: is it feasible to
achieve non-negligible secrecy rate in a real wireless network
by leveraging packet erasures? and how well can we do so
using our protocol?
A. Testbed
We show our testbed in Figure 1. It consists of 6 nodes
distributed over an indoor office area. Unless otherwise spec-
ified, the nodes are HTC Wildfire Android smartphones. We
set the phones to 802.11 ad-hoc mode, and we fixed their
transmission rate to 36 Mbps. In some experiments, we also
use WARP software radios [8].
In order for our approach to work, the wireless network must
provide a certain level of channel variability. The simplest
scenario where such variability exists is when the nodes are
not in direct line of sight, e.g., they are separated by office
walls. This is the scenario we implement in our testbed. Our
protocol can work even when the nodes are in direct line of
sight, but for that we need to use artificial noise (the terminals
create interference and force Eve to miss some of the traffic
they exchange). We are currently experimenting with that idea
(we have some early results here [9]), but we do not consider
this approach in this paper.
When we refer to an “experiment,” we mean that we place
one node in each room, and we run one round of our protocol.
T1T2
T3T4
T5 T6
Fig. 1. Our testbed. Each office is about 2× 3 meters.
In each experiment, one node plays the role of Eve, while the
rest play the role of 5 terminals that exchange pairwise secrets.
There are 6 possible arrangements of 5 terminals and Eve in 6
rooms, and we experiment with 4 different levels of transmit
power. Hence, each presented graph summarizes the results
of 4× 6 experiments (all the combinations of transmit-power
levels and node arrangements).
We present two kinds of graphs: minimum reliability as a
function of transmit power and minimum efficiency/secrecy
rate as a function of transmit power. Each reliability value
is the minimum reliability achieved by any terminal pair in
any of the 6 node arrangements. Each efficiency/secrecy rate
value is the minimum efficiency/secrecy rate achieved by any
terminal pair in any node arrangement.
B. Ideal Secrecy Rate
We start by looking at the ideal efficiency and secrecy rate
achievable in this testbed by leveraging packet erasures. In
particular, we measure the efficiency and secrecy rate of an
oracle-assisted protocol; this works like ours, with the only
difference that it does not estimate how much information
Eve obtains in the initial phase—that knowledge is directly
provided by the oracle. More specifically, instead of estimating
VE using Equation 2, we set it to the exact number of x-
packets shared by terminals Ti/Tj and missed by Eve. This
oracle-assisted protocol by construction achieves reliability 1,
because it knows exactly how much information Eve obtains
in the initial phase and computes the longest secret that is
completely unknown to Eve. Figure 2 (“Ideal” label) shows
the minimum efficiency/secrecy rate achieved by any terminal
pair using the oracle-assisted protocol, as a function of the
transmit power of the terminals.
First, we see that, if we perfectly knew Eve’s channel con-
ditions, each terminal pair could exchange tens of thousands
of secret bits per second (up to 55 secret Kbps, achieved
for a transmit power of 10 dbm), of which Eve would
have zero information independently from her computational
capabilities. We consider this an encouraging first result: It
shows that a real wireless network may offer enough channel
variability to enable the exchange of tens of thousands of
secret bits per second—enough to create a brand new 256-bit
encryption key every few milliseconds. Of course, we expect
this secrecy rate to become smaller as we consider adversaries
with increasingly more sophisticated hardware (e.g., multiple
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
M
ini
m
um
 se
cr
ec
y g
en
er
ati
on
 ra
te 
(Kb
ps
)
0 5 10 15 20 25
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
M
ini
m
um
 e
ffic
ien
cy
 (×
 
10
−
4 )
TxPower (dBm)
 
 
Ideal
Effective
Fig. 2. Minimum efficiency and secrecy rate as a function of TX power.
“Ideal” corresponds to the oracle-assisted protocol. “Effective” corresponds
to our protocol. Both protocols create up to 55 secret Kbps.
receiving antennas). However, this first result is good enough
to give us hope that we can achieve non-negligible secrecy
rate even against sophisticated adversaries.
Second, we see that secrecy rate first increases, then drops
as the transmit power of the terminals increases. This is due
to the following reason: As the transmit power of a terminal
increases, so does the quality of its channels to both the
other terminals and Eve. Hence, higher transmit power means
that (1) the terminals exchange traffic faster, but also that
(2) Eve overhears more of their exchanges. At low transmit
power, effect 1 dominates, and increasing the transmit power
improves secrecy rate; beyond 10 dbm, effect 2 dominates,
and increasing the transmit power benefits Eve more than the
terminals, decreasing the secrecy rate.
C. Reliability and Secrecy Rate of our Protocol
Next, we look at the performance of our protocol. Unlike
the oracle-assisted protocol, ours needs to estimate how much
information Eve obtains in the initial phase. If it overestimates
Eve’s knowledge, it creates a shorter secret than it could,
achieving lower efficiency/secrecy rate than the oracle-assisted
protocol. If it underestimates Eve’s knowledge, it creates a
longer secret than it should, achieving higher secrecy rate than
the oracle-assisted protocol, but reliability below 1. Hence,
there is a trade-off between secrecy rate (how fast we create
new secrets) and reliability (how secure these secrets are).
Ideally, we would want our protocol to behave like the
oracle-assisted one (achieve the same secrecy rate and reli-
ability 1). In practice, this is infeasible, as it would require
us to always estimate Eve’s knowledge with perfect accuracy.
Thankfully, it is also unnecessary: Suppose a secret has relia-
bility 0.8, which means that Eve can correctly guess the value
of one bit of the secret with probability 2−0.8 = 0.57. The
smallest secret that our protocol ever creates is one y-packet
(1 KB); reliability 0.8 means that Eve can correctly guess
the value of one y-packet with probability 2−0.8·8000 ≈ 0.
Hence, as long as the terminals use their pairwise secrets at
the granularity of a y-packet (e.g., they use at least one entire
y-packet as an encryption key), they are secure from Eve.
Figure 2 (“Effective” label) and Figure 3 show the minimum
efficiency/secrecy rate and minimum reliability of our protocol
per constructed Sij (where the minimum is over all i, j) as a
0.66
0.64
0.62
0.59
0.57
0.55
0.54
0.52
0.50
Pr
{gu
es
sin
g a
 se
cre
t b
it}
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
M
in
im
um
 re
lia
bil
ity
TxPower (dBm)
Fig. 3. Minimum reliability of our protocol as a function of TX power. All
the pairwise secrets that we create have reliability above 0.8.
function of the transmit power of the terminals.
Our protocol creates tens of thousands of secret bits per
second between each terminal pair (up to 55 secret Kbps,
achieved for a transmit power of 10 dbm). All of the pairwise
secrets that we create have reliability above 0.8 (and most
of them have reliability 1). We consider this an encouraging
result, too: It shows that, in a real wireless network, it may
be feasible to accurately estimate an adversary’s knowledge,
if we have a sufficiently dense deployment of collaborating
honest nodes. Of course, this estimation will become harder as
we consider adversaries with increasingly more sophisticated
hardware. However, this first result is good enough to give
us hope that we can achieve reasonable accuracy even against
sophisticated adversaries.
Our next step. In the above experiments, Eve gains knowl-
edge only from the information that is successfully delivered
to her application layer. There exist packets that reach Eve’s
receiver, yet are not delivered to her application because they
are corrupted beyond what the lower layers can repair. One
could argue that, if Eve rooted her phone and gained access
to every packet that reaches her physical layer, she would
improve her knowledge. The question is by how much.
To start answering this question, we used three WARP
software-defined radios3, configured with an 802.11-compliant
physical layer (16 QAM over OFDM), and we placed them
in our testbed. We make one of them (Alice) send out traffic,
while the other two (Bob and Eve) receive. The difference
from our earlier experiments is that now Eve tries to use
all the packets that reach her physical layer (with corrupted
payload or not) to increase her knowledge. First, we consider
the packets that are correctly received by Bob, and we measure
Eve’s knowledge (conditional entropy) about these packets4.
Then we repeat the experiment, assuming that an oracle
magically repairs the corrupted payload of every packet that
reaches Eve’s receiver. In the former case, Eve’s uncertainty on
Bob’s information originates from both corrupted and erased
symbols, whereas in the latter only from erased ones (that do
not reach Eve’s receiver at all).
3The smartphones used for our earlier experiments do not provide access
to received data that is discarded below the application layer.
4We do so by calculating the joint empirical distribution of the 16-QAM
symbols in the payload of Bob’s packets and the symbols that Eve receives—
correctly or not.
The results show that—at least in our testbed—Eve’s uncer-
tainty mostly depends on the erased in-the-air symbols, i.e.,
symbols that were not demodulated at all. For instance, if Alice
uses a transmit power of 15 dbm, in the second experiment
(where all payload corruption is corrected by the oracle), Eve
learns only an extra 0.1 bit-per-channel-use relative to the
first experiment. This indicates that the number of partially
corrupted packets that reach Eve’s receiver is relatively small,
hence they do not significantly increase Eve’s knowledge (or
reduce the secrecy rate achieved by our protocol).
We are currently examining more sophisticated receivers
that work directly with the analog physical signal (rather than
at symbol level), to examine ultimate information leakage.
VII. RELATED WORK
There exists a rich literature on creating shared secrets
between two nodes by leveraging channel variations, which
can be broadly divided into two categories: On the one hand,
there exists theoretical work on creating unconditionally secure
secrets under idealized conditions. The seminal contributions
were by Wyner [2] and Maurer [3] (see also [10] and refer-
ences therein). On the other hand, there exists practical work
that presents concrete, implementable protocols for wireless
environments (for lack of space, we only mention those that
were evaluated through implemented prototypes). Some of
them leverage the time-varying nature and reciprocity of wire-
less channels [11], [12], [13]. These achieve secret-generation
rates up to a few tens of bps (in modified 802.11 or 802.15
environments). In another proposal, Alice and Bob create
shared secrets by combining and heuristically condensing the
frames that are transmitted between them only once (based
on the assumption that these frames are less likely to have
been overheard by Eve) [14]. This has been implemented in
an 802.11 environment, but has not been evaluated in terms
of efficiency or reliability yet. In iJam, when Alice transmits,
Bob jams a part of her transmission in a special way (specific
to OFDM) that prevents Eve from guessing which part was
jammed; hence, Alice and Bob share common knowledge that
is secret from Eve, and they use it to create shared secrets [15].
This achieves a secret-generation rate up to 18 Kbps (in a
modified 802.11 environment).
We differ in the following ways: To the best of our knowl-
edge, our work is the first to consider multi-terminal pairwise
secret agreement, where broadcast is leveraged to efficiently
create multiple shared secrets at the same time. The existing
protocols focus on a single pair of nodes, hence they are not
designed to leverage broadcast, and they would not scale well
with the number of terminals (if applied to the multi-terminal
scenario). Moreover, our protocol achieves a secret-generation
rate of tens of Kbps, without requiring any custom physical-
layer operations that are specific to OFDM (or any other
transmission scheme). Finally, we should mention our earlier
workshop paper, which also presents a protocol for creating
shared wireless secrets, although that focuses on group (not
pairwise) secrets and relies on artificial interference [16].
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a protocol that enables a group of ter-
minals, connected to the same broadcast domain, to exchange
pairwise secrets in the presence of an adversary. We assume
nothing about the adversary’s computational capabilities, but
we assume that she cannot overhear all the information
received by any terminal. The key properties that differentiate
our protocol from related theoretical work are that it has
polynomial complexity, is readily implementable in simple
wireless devices, and scales well to an arbitrary number of
terminals. On the practical side, we deployed our protocol
on a small wireless testbed, where the terminals and the
adversary are smartphones located in adjacent offices. We
presented experimental evidence that 5 terminals can create
pairwise secrets at a rate of 55 Kbps, with their secrecy being
independent from the adversary’s computational capabilities.
We developed our protocol under the assumption that the
terminals are “honest but curious.” With a bit extra care, we
can relax it: The worst a dishonest terminal Ti can do is lie
about which packets it misses in the initial phase to cause the
other terminals to overestimate the number of packets missed
by Eve and create unreliable secrets. This works, only if Ti
is the terminal that missed the fewest packets in every round
of the initial phase. We can further increase our robustness
by estimating the secret size even more conservatively, e.g.,
by assuming that, in each round, Eve missed a fraction of the
second smallest value reported by any terminal.
Our biggest challenge will be to make our protocol ro-
bust against an adversary that possesses multiple receiving
antennas. Clearly, the more antennas an adversary has, the
more information she can receive. We need to tune our
conservativeness about the created secret size as a function
of the strength of the adversary that we want to thwart. For
instance, if we assume that Eve can be present at two separate
network locations, then Alice and Bob should estimate how
much of their shared information is missed by Eve based on
how much information is missed by pairs of terminals (as
opposed to single terminals). Our ultimate goal is to determine
the practical limits of our approach—how does secrecy rate
decrease as the network presence of the adversary increases.
REFERENCES
[1] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “A Method for
Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-key Cryptosystems,”
Communications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120-126, 1978.
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The Wire-tap Channel,” Bell System Tech. J.,
vol. 54, pp. 1355-1387, 1975.
[3] U. M. Maurer, “Secret Key Agreement by Public Discussion
from Common Information,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 39, pp. 733-742, 1993.
[4] Companies Developing QKD Systems: Id Quantique, MagiQ
Technologies, SmartQuantum, Quintessence Labs.
[5] A. Mink, X. Tang, L. Ma, T. Nakassis, B. Hershman, J.C.
Bienfang, D. Su, R. Boisvert, C. W. Clark, and C. J. Williams,
“High Speed Quantum Key Distribution System Supports One-
time Pad Encryption of Real-time Video,” in Proceedings of SPIE,
vol. 6244, 2006.
[6] L. Keller, A. Le, B. Cici, H. Seferoglu, C. Fragouli, and
A. Markopoulou, “Microcast: Cooperative Video Streaming on
Smartphones,” in Proceedings of the International Conference
on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services (MobiSys), 2012.
[7] F. J. Macwilliams and N. J. A. Sloane, “The Theory of Error
Correcting Codes,” North-Holland, 2006.
[8] “Rice University Wireless Open-Access Research Platform
(WARP),” http://warp.rice.edu.
[9] M. Jafari, U. Pulleti, E. Atsan, I. Safaka, C. Fragouli, K.
Argyraki, and S. Diggavi, “Exchanging Secrets Without Using
Cryptography”, http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.4991.
[10] B. Kanukurthi and L. Reyzin, “Key Agreement from Close
Secrets over Unsecured Channels,” in Proceedings of the
ACM/USENIX EUROCRYPT Conference, 2009.
[11] B. Azimi-Sadjadi, A. Kiayias, A. Mercado, and B. Yener,
“Robust Key Generation from Signal Envelopes in Wireless
Networks,” in Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS), 2007.
[12] C. Ye, S. Mathur, A. Reznik, Y. Shah, W. Trappe, and N. Man-
dayam, “Information-theoretically Secret Key Generation for
Fading Wireless Channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 240-254, 2010.
[13] J. Croft, N. Patwari, and S. Kasera, “Robust Uncorrelated Bit
Extraction Methodologies for Wireless Sensors,” in Proceedings
of the ACM/IEEE Conference on Information Processing in
Sensor Networks (IPSN), 2010.
[14] S. Xiao, W. Gong, and D. Towsley, “Secure Wireless Com-
munication with Dynamic Secrets,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
INFOCOM Conference, 2010.
[15] S. Gollakota and D. Katabi, “Physical Layer Wireless Security
Made Fast and Channel Independent,” in Proceedings of the IEEE
INFOCOM Conference, 2011.
[16] I. Safaka, C. Fragouli, K. Argyraki, and S. Diggavi, “Creating
Shared Secrets Out of Thin Air,” in Proceedings of the ACM
Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets), 2012.
[17] M. Mitzenmacher and E. Upfal, “Probability and Computing,
Randomized Algorithm and Probabilistic Analysis,” Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We consider our eavesdropper to be either Eve or one of the
participating terminals. Our eavesdropper has two occasions
to obtain information about the secret Sij : by overhearing a
fraction of the transmitted x-packets in the initial phase; or
because a terminal knows the source packets it transmitted.
Both these effects are captured in the calculation of the number
Mij . Under the theoretical network model conditions, we can
approximate these numbers with their average value; Lemma 6
shows that this approximation can become arbitrarily good
exponentially fast in N . Given that we use any value Mij
smaller or equal to the exact, the following Lemma 5 gives
a construction that does not allow the eavesdropper to obtain
any information about Sij . 
Lemma 5. Consider a set of N x-packets, say x1, . . . , xN ,
and assume an eavesdropper, Eve, has a subset of size NE
of the x-packets. Construct M = N − NE y-packets, say
y1, . . . , yM , as
Y = AX,
where matrix X has as rows the N x-packets, matrix Y
has as rows the N − NE y-packets, and A is the generator
matrix of a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) linear code
with parameters [N,N −NE , NE +1] (e.g., a Reed-Solomon
code [7]). Then the M y-packets are information-theoretically
secure from Eve, irrespective of which subset (of size NE) of
the x-packets Eve has.
Proof: .Let W be a matrix that has as rows the packets Eve
has. To prove that the y-packets are information-theoretically
secure from Eve, we must show that:
H(Y |W ) = H(Y ).
. We can write[
Y
W
]
=
[
A
AE
]
X
def
= BX,
where AE is a NE ×N matrix of rank(AE) = NE , which
specifies the NE distinct x-packets that are known to Eve. AE
is not known to us, however we know is that in each row of
AE there is only one 1 and the remaining elements are zero;
so all of the vectors in the row span of AE have Hamming
weight (the number of nonzero elements of a vector [7]) less
than or equal to NE . On the other hand, from construction,
rank(A) = N − NE , and each vector in the row span of A
has Hamming weight larger than or equal to NE +1 [7]; thus
the row span of A and AE are disjoint (except for the zero
vector) and the matrix B is full-rank, i.e. rank (B) = N .
. If the packets xi have length Λ, we have that:
H(Y |W ) = H(Y,W )−H(W ) =
= rank (B) Λ− rank(AE)Λ = (N −NE)Λ
= rank(A)Λ = H(Y ). 
B. Concentration to expected values
Lemma 6. The values of the random variables Mij , UkE , Vl,
as defined in Section III-E and used in Lemma 1, converge
exponentially fast in N to their expected values.
Proof: Consider the random variable UkE denoting the
number of x-packets transmitted by Tk and received by both
Ti/Tj but not Eve. We use a standard argument to show
it concentrates exponentially fast to its average. Define the
random variable η(l)q as
η(l)q =


1 if the qth x-packet is received
by terminals Ti/Tj and missed by Eve,
0 otherwise.
Then we can write UkE =
∑N
q=1 η
(l)
q and we have
µ , E(UkE) = (1− δki)(1− δkj)δkEN.
For 0 <  ≤ 1 we can write P [UkE − µ ≥ µ] ≤
exp
(
− 
2µ
3
)
, where in the last inequality we use Chernoff
bound [17, Chapter 4]. We can also write, for 0 <  ≤ 1,
P [UkE − µ ≤ µ] ≤ exp
(
− 
2µ
2
)
. Similar arguments hold for
the remaining variables in Section III-E.
